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YALE KAMISAR: WARRIOR SCHOLAR
Francis A. Allen*

My association with Yale Kamisar dates back to the 1950s. At that
time I became aware of the interesting publications of a young faculty
member at the University of Minnesota. The articles were well done,
most of them dealing with the Supreme Court's notable expansion of
constitutional doctrine relating to criminal procedure, then at full tide,
a field in which I also was writing. In addition, Yale had published a
remarkable article on the subject of euthanasia, impressive for the
thoroughness of its research and the clarity and force of its argument.
Fortunately, I decided to write to Yale and express my appreciation
for the work he was doing. It is possible that I am the author of Yale's
first fan letter. He responded warmly, and there began a conversation
that has continued for almost a half-century. The interchange has been
one of the profitable and pleasant features of my time in the law
schools.
To me the retirement of Yale Kamisar from the Michigan Law
School faculty marks the end of an important epoch in American legal
education and scholarship, an epoch in which by any definition Yale
was a leading figure.

His

generation

was too

young

to

have

participated in the Second World War, but many of its members retain
childhood memories of it. (Not all were too young to be drafted into
the Korean "police action," however, as Yale's own experience
demonstrates.) Acute awareness of the Nazi holocaust was a potent
influence in the lives of many in that generation; no doubt some could
number members of their extended families among the Holocaust
victims. It was not difficult for Yale and those of his contemporaries
who as law teachers elected to work with the problems of criminal
justice to perceive the dangers of abuse and the denial of human rights
when governments exercise the police function; and there was
abundant evidence that the reality and potentialities of such abuse
were not confined to the totalitarian regimes of Europe, but, on the
contrary, were clearly present in contemporary American society.
Despite the fact that there were somber problems to

be

confronted, Yale and his contemporaries spent a large part of their
careers in an invigorating atmosphere when confidence of a better
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future came easily, and opportunities for advancing needed changes
seemed available. The universities in the postwar world expanded
enrollments and functions, and, as is often the case, institutional
growth bred optimism. Most important to law teachers concerned with
criminal justice, the Warren Court, building on foundations laid during
the previous quarter-century, was finally making clear that the
constitutional

restraints

on

police

and

other

law-enforcement

procedures, especially in the states, were to be treated as more than
polite fictions. The new constitutional law provided law teachers with
occasions for exposition and analysis, and even opportunities to assist
the

courts

in

fashioning

constitutional

doctrine

in

theretofore

uncharted areas.
The conditions were favorable to the unfolding of Yale's career: a
scholarly field which he could enthusiastically embrace combined with
a burning ambition to gain recognition as a great legal authority. I
cannot say what combination of genes, family influence, and childhood
experiences fueled the ambition; but the result was a commitment to
his fields of interest that has not often been matched. His work
appeared to absorb his waking moments; fifteen-hour working days
were the norm. One of my favorite stories about Yale illustrates how
his scholarly efforts pervaded his life. On one occasion Yale informed
me that he was reading Dostoyevsky's great novel,

Crime and

Punishment. Later when I asked what he thought of the book he
expressed some disappointment, saying: "I didn't find one good
quotation in it for my casebook."
At least by the early 1960s Yale, through his efforts and innate
ability,

had

become

the leading commentator on constitutional

criminal procedure, a position which he deservedly retains to this day.
He published a stream of seminal articles that importantly influenced
the development of constitutional doctrine. Someone who took the
trouble to count found that Yale's work was cited more frequently in
the Supreme Court than that of any other writer, and if the many
citations in the lower federal and state courts, and in the works of
other writers, are also taken into account, some conception of the
importance of his influence can be gleaned.
Yale might reasonably be called the "father" of the Miranda rule.
Before the decision was handed down his voice was the most effective
in pointing to the need for judicial regulation of pretrial interrogation
of arrested persons, and he has been the leading defender of the rule
in the years that followed. He has been equally persistent in his
defense of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases. These
issues seem never to die. As recently as the last year or so he has
written in opposition to the efforts of those who seem committed to
cancel the gains achieved by the Supreme Court in mid-twentieth
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century, and has done it with the same verve and effectiveness that
characterized his work forty years ago.1 With the changing ideological
currents expressed in the Court in recent years, Yale no longer wields
the same influence as in the past. But as a defender of the earlier
advances, and by giving voice to views in danger of being submerged
in the dominant political trends of the moment, his present role is
hardly less important.
Yale's scholarly output deserves much closer attention than I can
give it here. A reader should not expect to find in his writings the
formulation or manipulation of jurisprudential abstractions. He has
found it unnecessary to articulate in a systematic way the values that
underlie his work. He believes it is self-evident that any nation
aspiring to be a free society must provide limitations, clearly stated
and conscientiously applied, to guide and limit the government's penal
powers. It is in the criminal process that the state brings to bear on the
individual the most stringent sanctions at its command. Abuses here
most clearly imperil human dignity and human freedom. Closely
connected with this proposition is Yale's assumption that courts are
appropriate vehicles to define and apply such limitations on the
powers of the state. This is not because judges are peculiarly qualified
for the task. Nor is it because the judicial process is well adapted to
monitor the activities of law-enforcement agencies and officers; there
are many practices greatly damaging to the integrity of the penal
system which, by their nature, are not amenable to the judicial
process. Resort to the courts to perform the supervisory function has
proceeded much farther in the United States than in other western
nations. The reason probably lies in the fact that, unlike other nations,
we have failed to develop alternative institutions charged with the task
of providing external administrative supervision and control of the
police and other law-enforcement agencies. The result is that in no
American state is there an official or agency accountable for the
decency and efficiency of the criminal justice system as a whole. The
elaborate body of constitutional doctrine relating to the criminal
process may in large measure represent a response to the deficiencies
in supervision and accountability provided by the criminal justice
system. Yale has accepted the situation as part of the reality with
which criminal justice scholarship must deal.
When Yale Kamisar sits down to write, he is preparing for battle.
His articles constitute prime examples of legal advocacy. It is an
advocacy, however, that enlightens rather than obfuscates the issues.
There is no inclination in Yale's work to reach a conclusion by simply
ignoring countervailing arguments, a tendency too often revealed even

1. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, In Defense
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2003).

of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule,
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Court. On the contrary, he

conscientiously seeks out and addresses the points raised by his
opponents, and not infrequently articulates them more effectively than
those who originally advanced them. Despite the thunder of battle,
Yale is able to admire the strong points made by his opponents and to
respect able adversaries. He has himself gained the admiration of
many of those who most strongly oppose his views. If I were asked to
identify

the

article

that

most

clearly

illustrates

the

style

and

effectiveness of his written work, I would probably point to his essay,
Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure.2 In it he protests a process in which accused persons in the
custody of the police are deprived of meaningful protection of
individual rights (the gatehouse), but are surrounded by all the
safeguards of trial in the courts (the mansion), often after it is too late.
No more effective demonstration of the need for regulation of pretrial
criminal procedure has been made. The power of Yale's irony and
outrage can be felt even after forty years.
There are many other attributes of Yale's written work that
deserve notice, but I shall mention only one of them. It is apparent
that

he

takes

pleasure

in

calling

attention

to

the

scholarly

achievements of others in his fields of interest, and especially enjoys
scanning the work of those who preceded him, an attribute rare in an
ahistorical age when many younger colleagues appear to be busy
reinventing wheels that were spinning effectively fifty or even sixty
years ago. Yale's demonstration of the modem relevance of an article
of the late Paul Kauper, first published in this Review in 1932,
illustrates this generosity and industry.3
Yale Kamisar has fully earned the right to rest on his laurels, but I
hope that he does not take full advantage of the opportunity. He is
badly needed at this hour. We are again passing through a dreary
succession of events when at the first threats of insecurity we jettison
many of our fundamental individual rights and immunities. Perhaps in
the future, as in the past, we shall again offer our mea culpas and
swear it must not happen again. It is a dangerous progression, and the
voice of Kamisar needs to be heard.
This is the happy Warrior; this is He
That every Man in arms should wish to be.

4

2. Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965).
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3. Paul Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused - A Remedy for the
30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 ( 1932), reprinted in 73 MICH. L. REV. 39 ( 1974).
4. 1 WILLIAM WORDSWORTH,
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